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Ms. Mary Noonan
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Noonan:
Re:

State v. Sampson
Case No. 890327-CA

Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Carlos R. Sampson cites the
following supplemental authority, Minnick v. Mississippi, Case
No. 89-6332,
U.S.
(December 3, 1990), also found at
199 0 West Law 186059 (courtesy copy attached), in support of his
argument that his fifth amendment rights were violated by the
procedures utilized by the police in his case. Specifically,
Mr. Sampson draws the Court's attention to page 4 of the West Law
opinion where the United States Supreme Court cites without
distinction to Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), previously
relied on in his briefs to this Court.
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1990 WL 186059 (U.S.)
P u b l i c a t i o n page r e f e r e n c e s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e for t h i s document.)
Robert S. MINNICK, P e t i t i o n e r
v.
MISSISSIPPI
No. 89-6332.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued October 3, 1990
Decided December 3, 1990
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
Syllabus
Petitioner Minnick was arrested on a Mississippi warrant for capital murder.
An interrogation by federal law enforcement officials ended when he requested a
lawyer, and he subsequently communicated with appointed counsel two or three
times. Interrogation was reinitiatedby a county deputy sheriff after Minnick
was told that he could not refuse to talk to him, and Minnick confessed. The
motion to suppress the confession was denied, and he was convicted and
sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court rejected his argument that the
confession was taken in violation of, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, reasoning that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 that once
an accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate questioning "until
counsel has been made available" to him did not apply, since counsel had been
made available.
Held: When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may
not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the
accused has consulted with his attorney. In context, the requirement that
counsel be "made available" to the accused refers not to the opportunity to
consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room, but to the right to
have the attorney present during custodial interrogation. This rule is
appropriate and necessary, since a single consultation with an attorney does
not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to
waive his rights and from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and may
increase as it is prolonged. The proposed exception is inconsistent with
Edwards' purpose to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present at
custodial interrogation and with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, where the
theory that the opportunity to consult with one's attorney would substantially
counteract the compulsion created by custodial interrogation was specifically
rejected. It also would undermine the advantages flowing from Edwards' clear
and unequivocal character. Since, under respondent's formulation of the rule,
Edwards' protection could be reinstated by a subsequent request for counsel, it
could pass in and out of existence multiple times, a vagary that would spread
confusion through the justice system and lead to a loss of respect for the
underlying constitutional principle. And such an exception would leave
uncertain the sort of consultation required to displace Edwards. In addition,
allowing a suspect whose counsel is prompt to lose Edwards' protection while
one whose counsel is dilatory would not would distort the proper conception of
an attorney's duty to his client and set a course at odds with what ought to be
effective representation. Since Minnick/s interrogation was initiated by the
police in a formal interview which he was compelled to attend, after Minnick
had previously made a specific request for counsel, it was impermissible. Pp.
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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551 So. 2d 77, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined. SOUTER, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
To protect the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment, we have held that the police must terminate interrogation of an
accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 474 (1966). We reinforced the protections of
Miranda in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-485 (1981), which held that
once the accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate questioning
"until counsel has been made available" to him. The issue in the case before
us is whether Edwards' protection ceases once the suspect has consulted with an
attorney.
Petitioner Robert Minnick and fellow prisoner James Dyess escaped from a
county jail in Mississippi and, a day later, broke into a mobile home in search
of weapons. In the course of the burglary they were interrupted by the arrival
of the trailer's owner, Ellis Thomas, accompanied by Lamar Lafferty and
Lafferty's infant son. Dyess and Minnick used the stolen weapons to kill
Thomas and the senior Lafferty. Minnickfs story is that Dyess murdered one
victim and forced Minnick to shoot the other. Before the escapees could get
away, two young women arrived at the mobile home. They were held at gunpoint,
then bound hand and foot. Dyess and Minnick fled in Thomas' truck, abandoning
the vehicle in New Orleans. The fugitives continued to Mexico, where they
fought, and Minnick then proceeded alone to California. Minnick was arrested
in Lemon Grove, California, on a Mississippi warrant, some four months after
the murders.
The confession at issue here resulted from the last interrogation of Minnick
while he was held in the San Diego jail, but we first recount the events which
preceded it. Minnick was arrested on Friday, August 22, 1986. Petitioner
testified that he was mistreated by local police during and after the arrest.
The day following the arrest, Saturday, two FBI agents came to the jail to
interview him. Petitioner testified that he refused to go to the interview,
but was told he would "have to go down or else."
App. 45. The FBI report
indicates that the agents read petitioner his Miranda warnings, and that he
acknowledged he understood his rights. He refused to sign a rights waiver
form, however, and said he would not answer "very many" questions. Minnick
told the agents about the jail break and the flight, and described how Dyess
threatened and beat him. Early in the interview, he sobbed "[i]t was my life
or theirs," but otherwise he hesitated to tell what happened at the trailer.
The agents reminded him he did not have to answer questions without a lawyer
present. According to the report, "Minnick stated 'Come back Monday when I
have a lawyer,' and stated that he would make a more complete statement then
with his lawyer present."
App. 16. The FBI interview ended.
After the FBI interview, an appointed attorney met with petitioner.
Petitioner spoke with the lawyer on two or three occasions, though it is not
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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clear from the record whether all of these conferences were in person.
On Monday, August 25, Deputy Sheriff J. C. Denham of Clarke County,
Mississippi, came to the San Diego jail to question Minnick. Minnick testified
that his jailers again told him he would flhave to talk" to Denham and that he
"could not refuse."
Id., at 45. Denham advised petitioner of his rights, and
petitioner again declined to sign a rights waiver form. Petitioner told Denham
about the escape and then proceeded to describe the events at the mobile home.
According to petitioner, Dyess jumped out of the mobile home and shot the first
of the two victims, once in the back with a shotgun and once in the head with a
pistol. Dyess then handed the pistol to petitioner and ordered him to shoot
the other victim, holding the shotgun on petitioner until he did so.
Petitioner also said that when the two girls arrived, he talked Dyess out of
raping or otherwise hurting them.
Minnick was tried for murder in Mississippi. He moved to suppress all
statements given to the FBI or other police officers, including Denham. The
trial court denied the motion with respect to petitioner's statements to
Denham, but suppressed his other statements. Petitioner was convicted on two
counts of capital murder and sentenced to death.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the confession to Denham was taken in
violation of his rights to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the claims. With respect to the Fifth
Amendment aspect of the case, the court found "the Edwards bright line rule as
to initiation" inapplicable. 551 So. 2d 77, 83 (1988). Relying on language in
Edwards indicating that the bar on interrogating the accused after a request
for counsel applies " 'until counsel has been made available to him,'
' ' ibid., quoting Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 484-485, the court concluded
that "[s]ince counsel was made available to Minnick# his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel was satisfied."
551 So. 2d, at 83. The court also rejected the
Sixth Amendment claim, finding that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel when he spoke with Denham. Id., at 83-85. We granted certiorari,
495 U. S.
(1990), and, without reaching any Sixth Amendment implications in
the case, we decide that the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards is not
terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel.
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 474, we indicated that once an individual in
.custody invokes his right to counsel, interrogation "must cease until an
attorney is present" ; at that point, "the individual must have an opportunity
to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning."
Edwards gave force to these admonitions, finding it
"inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their
instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his
right to counsel."
451 U. S., at 485. We held that "when an accused has
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation even if he has
been advised of his rights."
Id., at 484. Further, an accused who requests
an attorney, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."
Id., at
484-485.
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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Edwards is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving
his previously asserted Miranda rights."
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.
S.
,
(1990). See also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984). The
rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the
result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would
otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness, and
implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward terms.
The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the
certainty of its application. We have confirmed that the Edwards rule
provides " 'clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement
profession."
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 682 (1988). Cf. Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 425-426 (1986). Even before Edwards, we noted that
Miranda's "relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the
accused's request for an attorney ... has the virtue of informing police and
prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial
interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in
specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought
to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement
agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly
probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under
traditional Fifth Amendment analysis."
Fare v. Michael C , 442 U. S. 707,
718 (1979). This pre-Edwards explanation applies as well to Edwards and its
progeny. Arizona v. Roberson, supra, at 681-682.
The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on our statement in Edwards that an
accused who invokes his right to counsel "is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to
him.*.."
451 U. S., at 484-485. We do not interpret this language to mean,
as the Mississippi court thought, that the protection of Edwards terminates
once counsel has consulted with the suspect. In context, the requirement that
counsel be "made available" to the accused refers to more than an opportunity
to consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room.
In Edwards, we focused on Miranda's instruction that when the accused invokes
his right to counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present," 384 U. S., at 474 (emphasis added), agreeing with Edwards'
contention that he had not waived his right "to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation."
451 U. S., at 482 (emphasis added). In the
sentence preceding the language quoted by the Mississippi Supreme Court, we
referred to the "right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation," and in the sentence following, we again quoted the phrase
M
'interrogation must cease until an attorney is present' ' ' from Miranda.
451 U. S., at 484-485 (emphasis added). The full sentence relied on by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, moreover, says: "We further hold that an accused,
such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police."
Ibid, (emphasis added).
Our emphasis on counsel's presence at interrogation is not unique to Edwards.
It derives from Miranda, where we said that in the cases before us "[t]he
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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presence of counsel .•. would be the adequate protective device necessary to
make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the
government established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion."
384 U.
S., at 466. See Fare v. Michael C , supra, at 719. Our cases following
Edwards have interpreted the decision to mean that the authorities may not
initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence. Writing for a
plurality of the Court, for instance, then JUSTICE REHNQUIST described the
holding of Edwards to be "that subsequent incriminating statements made
without [Edwards'] attorney present violated the rights secured to the
defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1043 (1983) (emphasis
added). See also Arizona v. Roberson, supra, at 680 ("The rule of the Edwards
case came as a corollary to Miranda's admonition that '[i]f the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present' ' ') ; Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 52 (1985) ("In
Edwards v. Arizona, ... this Court ruled that a criminal defendant's rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the use of his
confession obtained by police instigated interrogation without counsel present
after he requested an attorney" ). These descriptions of Edwards' holding are
consistent with our statement that " [p]reserving the integrity of an accused's
choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of
Edwards and its progeny."
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 291 (1988).
In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases demonstrates that
we have interpreted the rule to bar police initiated interrogation unless the
accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever the
ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when counsel
is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate
interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted
with his attorney.
We consider our ruling to be an appropriate and necessary application of the
Edwards rule. A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the
suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his
rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may
increase as custody is prolonged. The case before us well illustrates the
pressures, and abuses, that may be concomitants of custody. Petitioner
testified that though he resisted, he was required to submit to both the FBI
and the Denham interviews. In the latter instance, the compulsion to submit to
interrogation followed petitioner's unequivocal request during the FBI
interview that questioning cease until counsel was present. The case
illustrates also that consultation is not always effective in instructing the
suspect of his rights. One plausible interpretation of the record is that
petitioner thought he could keep his admissions out of evidence by refusing to
sign a formal waiver of rights. If the authorities had complied with Minnick's
request to have counsel present during interrogation, the attorney could have
corrected Minnick's misunderstanding, or indeed counseled him that he need not
make a statement at all. We decline to remove protection from police initiated
questioning based on isolated consultations with counsel who is absent when the
interrogation resumes.
The exception to Edwards here proposed is inconsistent with Edwards' purpose
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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to protect the suspect's right to have counsel present at custodial
interrogation. It is inconsistent as well with Miranda, where we specifically
rejected respondent's theory that the opportunity to consult with one's
attorney would substantially counteract the compulsion created by custodial
interrogation. We noted in Miranda that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to
the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret
interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel
prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning
if the defendant so desires."
384 U. S., at 470 (citation omitted).
The exception proposed, furthermore, would undermine the advantages flowing
from Edwards' "clear and unequivocal" character. Respondent concedes that even
after consultation with counsel, a second request for counsel should reinstate
the Edwards protection. We are invited by this formulation to adopt a regime
in which Edwards' protection could pass in and out of existence multiple times
prior to arraignment, at which point the same protection might reattach by
virtue of our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S.
625 (1986). Vagaries of this sort spread confusion through the justice system
and lead to a consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional
principle.
In addition, adopting the rule proposed would leave far from certain the sort
of consultation required to displace Edwards. Consultation is not a precise
concept, for it may encompass variations from a telephone call to say that the
attorney is in route, to a hurried interchange between the attorney and client
in a detention facility corridor, to a lengthy in person conference in which
the attorney gives full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might
be covered in further interrogations. And even with the necessary scope of
consultation settled, the officials in charge of the case would have to confirm
the occurrence and, possibly, the extent of consultation to determine whether
further interrogation is permissible. The necessary inquiries could interfere
with the attorney client privilege.
Added to these difficulties in definition and application of the proposed rule
is our concern over its consequence that the suspect whose counsel is prompt
would lose the protection of Edwards, while the one whose counsel is dilatory
would not. There is more than irony to this result. There is a strong
possibility that it would distort the proper conception of the attorney's duty
to the client and set us on a course at odds with what ought to be effective
representation.
Both waiver of rights and admission of guilt are consistent with the
affirmation of individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal
justice system. It does not detract from this principle, however,* to insist
that neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both
particular and systemic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were
not the inducing cause. The Edwards rule sets forth a specific standard to
fulfill these purposes, and we have declined to confine it in other instances.
See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988). It would detract from the
efficacy of the rule to remove its protections based on consultation with
counsel.
Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections
after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the
C0PR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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conversation or discussions with the authorities; but that is not the case
before us. There can be no doubt that the interrogation in question was
initiated by the police; it was a formal interview which petitioner was
compelled to attend. Since petitioner made a specific request for counsel
before the interview, the policeinitiated interrogation was impermissible.
Petitioner's statement to Denham was not admissible at trial.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
The Court today establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a criminal
suspect, after invoking his Miranda right to counsel, can never validly waive
that right during any policeinitiated encounter, even after the suspect has
been provided multiple Miranda warnings and has actually consulted his
attorney. This holding builds on foundations already established in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), but "the rule of Edwards is our rule, not a
constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify its expansion."
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 688 (1988) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).
Because I see no justification for applying the Edwards irrebuttable
presumption when a criminal suspect has actually consulted with his attorney, I
respectfully dissent.
I
Some recapitulation of pertinent facts is in order, given the Court's
contention that ff[t]he case before us well illustrates the pressures, and
abuses, that may be concomitants of custody." Ante, at 7. It is undisputed
that the FBI agents who first interviewed Minnick on Saturday, August 23, 1986,
advised him of his Miranda rights before any questioning began. Although he
refused to sign a waiver form, he agreed to talk to the agents, and described
his escape from prison in Mississippi and the ensuing events. When he came to
what happened at the trailer, however, Minnick hesitated. The FBI agents then
reminded him that he did not have to answer questions without a lawyer
present. Minnick indicated that he would finish his account on Monday, when he
had a lawyer, and the FBI agents terminated the interview forthwith.
Minnick was then provided with an attorney, with whom he consulted several
times over the weekend. As Minnick testified at a subsequent suppression
hearing:
,f
I talked to [my attorney] two different times and it might have been three
different times.... He told me that first day that he was my lawyer and that
he was appointed to me and not to talk to nobody and not tell nobody nothing
and to not sign no waivers and not sign no extradition papers or sign anything
and that he was going to get a court order to have any of the police I advised
him of the FBI talking to me and he advised me not to tell anybody anything
that he was going to get a court order drawn up to restrict anybody talking to
me outside of the San Diego Police Department." App. 46-47.
On Monday morning, Minnick was interviewed by Deputy Sheriff J. C. Denham, who
had come to San Diego from Mississippi. Before the interview, Denham reminded
Minnick of his Miranda rights. Minnick again refused to sign a waiver form,
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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but he did talk with Denham, and did not ask for his attorney. As Minnick
recalled at the hearing, he and Denham
"went through several different conversations about first, about how everybody
was back in the county jail and what everybody was doing, had he heard from
Mama and had he went and talked to Mama and had he seen my brother, Tracy, and
several different other questions pertaining to such things as that. And, we
went off into how the escape went down at the county jail...."
App. 50.
Minnick then proceeded to describe his participation in the double murder at
the trailer.
Minnick was later extradited and tried for murder in Mississippi. Before
trial, he moved to suppress the statements he had given the FBI agents and
Denham in the San Diego jail. The trial court granted the motion with respect
to the statements made to the FBI agents, but ordered a hearing on the
admissibility of the statements made to Denham. After receiving testimony from
both Minnick and Denham, the court concluded that Minnick's confession had
been "freely and voluntarily given from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt," id., at 25, and allowed Denham to describe Minnick's confession to the
jury.
The Court today reverses the trial court's conclusion. It holds that, because
Minnick had asked for counsel during the interview with the FBI agents, he
could not as a matter of law validly waive the right to have counsel present
during the conversation initiated by Denham. That Minnick's original request
to see an attorney had been honored, that Minnick had consulted with his
attorney on several occasions, and that the attorney had specifically warned
Minnick not to speak to the authorities, are irrelevant. That Minnick was
familiar with the criminal justice system in general or Miranda warnings in
particular (he had previously been convicted of robbery in Mississippi and
assault with a deadly weapon in California) is also beside the point. The
confession must be suppressed, not because it was "compelled," nor even
because it was obtained from an individual who could realistically be assumed
to be unaware of his rights, but simply because this Court sees fit to
prescribe as a "systemic assurancfe]," ante, at 9, that a person in custody
who has once asked for counsel cannot thereafter be approached by the police
unless counsel is present. Of course the Constitution's proscription of
compelled testimony does not remotely authorize this incursion upon state
practices; and even our recent precedents are not a valid excuse.
II
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), this Court declared that a
criminal suspect has a right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, as a prophylactic assurance that the "inherently compelling
pressures,", id. at 467, of such interrogation will not violate the Fifth
Amendment. But Miranda did not hold that these "inherently compelling
pressures" precluded a suspect from waiving his right to have counsel
present. On the contrary, the opinion recognized that a State could establish
that the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived ... his right to retained
or appointed counsel."
Id., at 475. For this purpose, the Court expressly
adopted the "high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional
rights," ibid., set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
The Zerbst waiver standard, and the means of applying it, are familiar:
Waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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privilege," id., at 464; and whether such a relinquishment or abandonment has
occurred depends "in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused," ibid. We have applied the Zerbst approach in many contexts where a
State bears the burden of showing a waiver of constitutional criminal
procedural rights. See, e. g. , Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 835
(1975) (right to the assistance of counsel at trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U. S. 1, 4 (1966) (right to confront adverse witnesses); Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275-280 (1942) (right to trial by jury).
Notwithstanding our acknowledgment that Miranda rights are "not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but . . . instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected," Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974), we have adhered to the principle that
nothing less than the Zerbst standard for the waiver of constitutional r! qhts
applies to the waiver of Miranda rights. Until Edwards, however, we refrained
from imposing on the States a higher standard for the waiver of Miranda
rights. For example, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975), we re> l:ed a
proposed irrebuttable presumption that a criminal suspect, after invokim the
Miranda right to remain silent, could not validly waive the right during *ny
subsequent questioning by the police. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 u. S.
369 (1979) we rejected a proposed rule that waivers of Miranda rights must be
deemed involuntary absent an explicit assertion of waiver by the suspect . And
in Fare v. Michael C , 442 U. S. 707, 723-727 (1979) we declined to hold i:hat
waivers of Miranda rights by juveniles are per se involuntary.
Edwards, however, broke with this approach, holding that a defendant's \ /iver
of his Miranda right to counsel, made in the course of a police initiate^
encounter after he had requested counsel but before counsel had been pro\ ided,
was per se involuntary. The case stands as a solitary exception to our waiver
jurisprudence. It does, to be sure, have the desirable consequences described
in today's opinion. In the narrow context in which it applies, it proviso?.
100% assurance against confessions that are "the result of coercive
pressures," ante, at 4; it " 'preventfs] police from badgering a defeivw-nt, '
' ' ibid, (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S.
,
(1990)); it
"conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making
difficult determinations of voluntariness," ante, at 4; and it provides
" ' "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law enforcement profession,'
' ' ibid, (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S., at 682). But so wouih' a.
rule that simply excludes all confessions by all persons in police custody.
The value of any prophylactic rule (assuming the authority to adopt a
prophylactic rule) must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gaSnfcd,
but also on the basis-of what is lost. In all other contexts we have thought
the above described consequences of abandoning Zerbst outweighed by " 'i\>e need
for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal .lows,'
' ' Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 426 (1986). "Admissions of guilt," we
have said, "are more than merely 'desirable'; they are essential to society's
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who vio'Ji-te
the
law."
Ibid, (citation omitted).
Ill
In this case, of course, we have not been called upon to reconsider Edwards,
but simply to determine whether its irrebuttable presumption should continue
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after a suspect has actually consulted with his attorney. Whatever
justifications might support Edwards are even less convincing in this context.
Most of the Court's discussion of Edwards which stresses repeatedly, in
various formulations, the case's emphasis upon "the 'right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation,' ' ' ante, at 5, quoting 451 U. S., at
482 (emphasis added by the Court) is beside the point. The existence and the
importance of the Miranda created right "to have counsel present" are
unquestioned here. What is questioned is why a State should not be given the
opportunity to prove (under Zerbst) that the right was voluntarily waived by a
suspect who, after having been read his Miranda rights twice and having
consulted with counsel at least twice, chose to speak to a police officer (and
to admit his involvement in two murders) without counsel present.
Edwards did not assert the principle that no waiver of the Miranda right "to
have counsel present" is possible. It simply adopted the presumption that no
waiver is voluntary in certain circumstances, and the issue before us today is
how broadly those circumstances are to be defined. They should not, in my
view, extend beyond the circumstances present in Edwards itself where the
suspect in custody asked to consult an attorney, and was interrogated before
that attorney had ever been provided. In those circumstances, the Edwards rule
rests upon an assumption similar to that of Miranda itself: that when a
suspect in police custody is first questioned he is likely to be ignorant of
his rights and to feel isolated in a hostile environment. This likelihood is
thought to justify special protection against unknowing or coerced waiver of
rights. After a suspect has seen his request for an attorney honored, however,
and has actually spoken with that attorney, the probabilities change. The
suspect then knows that he has an advocate on his side, and that the police
will permit him to consult that advocate. He almost certainly also has a
heightened awareness (above what the Miranda warning itself will provide) of
his right to remain silent since at the earliest opportunity "any lawyer worth
his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to
the police under any circumstances."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59
(1949) (Opinion of Jackson, J.).
Under these circumstances, an irrebuttable presumption that any police
prompted confession is the result of ignorance of rights, or of coercion, has
no genuine basis in fact. After the first consultation, therefore, the Edwards
exclusionary rule should cease to apply. Does this mean, as the Court implies,
that the police will thereafter have license to "badger" the suspect? Only if
all one means by "badger" is asking, without such insistence or frequency as
would constitute coercion, whether he would like to reconsider his decision not
to confess. Nothing in the Constitution (the only basis for our intervention
here) prohibits such inquiry, which may often produce the desirable result of a
voluntary confession. If and when post-consultation police inquiry becomes so
protracted or threatening as to constitute coercion, the Zerbst standard will
afford the needed protection.
One should not underestimate the extent to which the Court's expansion of
Edwards constricts law enforcement. Today's ruling, that the invocation of a
right to counsel permanently prevents a police initiated waiver, makes it
largely impossible for the police to urge a prisoner who has initially declined
to confess to change his mind or indeed, even to ask whether he has changed his
mind. Many persons in custody will invoke the Miranda right to counsel during
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the first interrogation, so that the permanent prohibition will attach at
once. Those who do not do so will almost certainly request or obtain counsel
at arraignment. We have held that a general request for counsel, after the
Sixth Amendment right has attached, also triggers the Edwards prohibition of
policesolicited confessions, see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), and
I presume that the perpetuality of prohibition announced in today's opinion
applies in that context as well. "Perpetuality" is not too strong a term,
since, although the Court rejects one logical moment at which the Edwards
presumption might end, it suggests no alternative. In this case Minnick was
reapproached by the police three days after he requested counsel, but the
result would presumably be the same if it had been three months, or three
years, or even three decades. This perpetual irrebuttable presumption will
apply, I might add, not merely to interrogations involving the original crime
but to those involving other subjects as well. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.
S. 675 (1988).
Besides repeating the uncontroverted proposition that the suspect has a "right
to have counsel present," the Court stresses the clarity and simplicity that
are achieved by today's holding. Clear and simple rules are desirable, but
only in pursuance of authority that we possess. We are authorized by the Fifth
Amendment to exclude confessions that are "compelled," which we have
interpreted to include confessions that the police obtain from a suspect in
custody without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent.
Undoubtedly some bright line rules can be adopted to implement that principle,
narking out the situations in which knowledge or voluntariness cannot possibly
be established for example, a rule excluding confessions obtained after five
lours of continuous interrogation. But a rule excluding all confessions that
follow upon even the slightest police inquiry cannot conceivably be justified
Dn this basis. It does not rest upon a reasonable prediction that all such
confessions, or even most such confessions, will be unaccompanied by a knowing
and voluntary waiver.
It can be argued that the same is true of the category of confessions excluded
Dy the Edwards rule itself. I think that is so, but, as I have discussed
above, the presumption of involuntariness is at least more plausible for that
category. There is, in any event, a clear and rational line between that
category and the present one, and I see nothing to be said for expanding upon a
past mistake. Drawing a distinction between police initiated inquiry before
consultation with counsel and police initiated inquiry after consultation with
counsel is assuredly more reasonable than other distinctions Edwards has
already led us into such as the distinction between police initiated inquiry
after assertion of the Miranda right to remain silent, and police initiated
Inquiry after assertion of the Miranda right to counsel, see Kamisar, The
Sdwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, in 5
?he Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 157 (J. Choper, Y. Kamisar, & L.
Tribe eds. 1984) ("[EJither Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was" ) ; or
:he distinction between what is needed to prove waiver of the Miranda right to
lave counsel present and what is needed to prove waiver of rights found in the
Constitution.
The rest of the Court's arguments can be answered briefly. The suggestion
:hat it will either be impossible or ethically impermissible to determine
zhether a "consultation" between the suspect and his attorney has occurred is
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